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Evaluating the Legacies of State-building:  
Success, Failure and the Role of 
Responsibility  
 
Oisín Tansey 
 
 
 
Abstract 
What impact do international state-building missions have on the domestic politics of 
states they seek to build, and how can we measure this impact with confidence? This 
article seeks to address these questions and challenge some existing approaches that 
often appear to assume that state-builders leave lasting legacies rather than 
demonstrating such influence with the use of carefully chosen empirical evidence. Too 
often, domestic conditions that follow in the wake of international state-building are 
assumed to follow as a result of international intervention, usually due to insufficient 
attention to the causal processes that link international actions to domestic outcomes. 
The article calls for greater appreciation of the methodological challenges to establishing 
causal inferences regarding the legacies of state-building, and identifies three qualitative 
methodological strategies – process tracing, counterfactual analysis and the use of control 
cases - that can be used to improve confidence in causal claims about state-building 
legacies. The article concludes with a case study of international state-building in East 
Timor, highlighting several flaws of existing evaluations of the United Nations’ role in 
East Timor and identifying the critical role that domestic actors play even in the context 
of authoritative international intervention.  
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What impact do international state-building missions have on the domestic politics of 
states they seek to build, and how can we measure this impact with confidence? These 
questions are fundamental to the goal of evaluating state-building success and failure, yet 
existing approaches too often appear to assume that state-builders leave lasting legacies 
rather than demonstrating the existence of such legacies with the use of carefully chosen 
empirical evidence. Consequently, state-building missions are often declared to have 
succeeded or failed based on the identification of simple correlations, where political 
developments that follow international intervention are taken to be the result of that 
intervention. 
This article seeks to challenge existing approaches to the evaluation of international 
state-building and advocates greater engagement with questions of causal inference in the 
state-building literature. Robust evaluations of state-building success or failure can only 
be made if it is first ascertained that the international mission is causally responsible for the 
conditions on the ground being used to measure success or failure; it makes no sense to 
evaluate an international mission using agreed ‘standards of success’ if the indicators 
being measured are the result of domestic rather than international efforts. This in turn 
requires a concern with the causal mechanisms that link international actions to 
domestic-level outcomes, and requires consideration of appropriate methodological 
strategies. In short, we can only judge the success or failure of an international mission 
when we are confident that the domestic political events we are using as indicators of 
success or failure are the legacies of the international mission rather than other factors, 
and we can only achieve this confidence when we establish in as rigorous a fashion as 
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possible what domestic conditions the international mission is itself causally responsible 
for bringing about.  
The overall argument of the article is that we need to be more systematic in our 
efforts to evaluate the legacies of international state-building missions, and that if we are, 
we see that the legacies of international operations are often fewer than has been widely 
suggested in the literature. When more emphasis is placed on identifying the causal 
mechanisms that lead from international actions to domestic outcomes, it is often clear 
that international influence is overshadowed by the primacy of domestic politics.  
The article proceeds in three overall sections. The first section examines existing 
efforts to evaluate international legacies and state-building success and failure, and 
highlights some of the problems that stand in the way of making robust causal 
assessments. The second section addresses the issue of political responsibility, and argues 
that we can only reasonably evaluate international operations based on consideration of 
the domestic conditions for which they are causally responsible. It also identifies three 
qualitative methodological strategies through which such responsibility can be more 
confidently established, namely process tracing, counterfactual analysis and the use of 
control cases. The final section of the paper examines the case of East Timor and 
identifies two causal arguments from the literature regarding the impact of the UN 
presence.  The methodological flaws of each argument are identified, and process tracing 
and counterfactual analysis are used to suggest alternative legacies of state-building in 
East Timor that place greater emphasis on the role of domestic rather than international 
actors.  
 
Evaluating State-building Success and Failure 
Paris and Sisk define state-building as a ‘sub-component of peace-building’ that is 
concerned with ‘the strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental 
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institutions in countries that are emerging from conflicts’.1 In much of the state-building 
literature, the state is seen not just as a tax generating agency or provider of basic public 
services, but as a body of institutions that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force and can be authoritative enough to mediate disputes among societal groups and, 
ideally, command their loyalty and compliance. If state-building is to have any hope of 
building peace, it is a state whose institutions must combine both authority and 
legitimacy.2 
A key goal within the literatures on peace-building and state-building is to establish 
the effect of international state-building operations on the domestic politics of state 
formation, and to evaluate the success or failure of these missions accordingly.3 
However, there is no consensus regarding which standards of success and failure should 
be used, and approaches range from those that have relatively low standards of success 
to those that require major achievements in order for a positive assessment to be 
granted. 
Charles Call identifies four standards for success that appear regularly in the 
literature.4 The first, minimalist approach concerns the question of whether war has 
recurred after the international authorities have left, and simply requires that the original 
conflict that led to the international intervention not re-emerge in the early years after the 
                                                
1 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Introduction’ in Paris and Sisk (eds) The Dilemmas of State-
building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London and New York, Routledge: 
2009), p.14.  
2 See also Charles T. Call, ‘Ending Wars, Building States’, in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth 
(eds) Building States to Build Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), p.7. 
3 Although this article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of large-scale international state-
building missions, its arguments apply equally to other forms of intervention such as peace-
keeping and peace-building. For recent assessments of state-building, and peace-building, 
missions, see Mats Berdal, Building Peace After War (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2009), Paris and Sisk, ‘Dilemmas of State-building’, Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth 
(eds), Building States to Build Peace, (Lynne Rienner, 2008), and Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas 
Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
4 Charles T. Call, ‘Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peace-building 
Success’, Civil Wars, Volume 10, No.2, 2008, pp.173-194. 
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international withdrawal. The second standard is more exacting, and involves identifying 
the root causes of the conflict and establishing whether they have been resolved by the 
international mission’s presence. The third standard goes beyond issues of conflict 
resolution and involves a measure of whether an effective state or legitimate political 
regime exists after the mission’s end. Finally, the fourth standard uses the extent of 
economic recovery as a measure for mission success, and includes indicators such as 
GDP and poverty levels.  
There is, however, no agreement on which of these standards should be used, and 
debates revolve around the level at which to set each standard and which combination of 
standards to use. Call himself finds that including considerations of the resolution of root 
causes, or the attainment of economic recovery, to be excessive, and warns against 
‘overburdening’ success with multiple and unachievable goals.5 Susan Woodward 
similarly argues against measuring success based on assessment of whether roots causes 
of the conflict have been resolved, not least because such causes are often contested by 
the parties to the conflict itself.6 Roland Paris takes as his standard of success the 
indicator that a ‘stable and lasting peace’ has been achieved, while Downs and Stedman, 
argue for a less exacting standard, and use as their key measure of success whether large-
scale violence has been brought to an end while the international authorities are present.7  
This discussion and debate about standards of measurements cuts to a key issue in 
evaluating the legacies of international interventions, as it provides sustained attention to 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Susan Woodard, ‘Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve 
Peace-building Interventions’, Journal of Intervention and State-building, Vol.1, Issue 2, 2007, pp.143-
170 
7 George Downs and Stephen John Stedman ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’ in 
Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds) Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements (Lynne Rienner, 2002), p.49; Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building 
Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.56. In his more recent work, Paris 
has suggested an alternative measure of evaluation, namely whether host countries are ‘better off 
than they would have been without such missions’. See Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review 
of International Studies, Vol.36, 20120, p.352. 
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the outcomes we expect international authorities to be able to provide and suggests a 
way of evaluating the performance of those international actors. Yet even if this debate 
were resolved, and consensus emerged on a common set of standards, there is also the 
further difficult challenge of establishing that the political conditions on the ground are 
the result of the international activities being evaluated. Even if all scholars were to agree 
that there should be a minimal standard of an absence of conflict at the point of 
international withdrawal, we can only count such an absence of conflict as an 
international success if we can be confident that it results from international activities, and 
does not exist independently of them, or even despite them. In other words, the 
challenge is to determine that any correlation between the presence of an international 
mission and the presence of the chosen indicators of success is one that is based on 
causation rather than chance.  
However, there are serious obstacles to meeting this challenge, and strategies aimed at 
demonstrating causal connections have to overcome a number of difficulties. Downs and 
Stedman have already identified a number of obstacles to the evaluation of international 
effects: the passage of time tends to erode the potential for robust causal inference, 
international and domestic variables interact in often complex ways that are difficult to 
untangle, state-building involves a multiplicity of actors that adds further complexity, and 
evaluation must also take into account the diversity of starting points within each host 
country.8 Other obstacles to making robust causal inferences include the large number of 
variables at work in every case, the relatively small number of state-building cases that 
can be included in any single analysis, and the problem that there can be multiple paths 
to the same outcome (also known as the problem of equifinality).9 
                                                
8 See in particular Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, and Roland 
Paris, At War’s End, pp.55-62. 
9 The article is primarily concerned with qualitative work on evaluating state-building missions. 
For a discussion of wider challenges to the development of causal inferences in case study 
research, see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
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Each of these challenges represents an obstacle to be overcome, and as a result there 
are difficulties in establishing with confidence the political impact of international 
operations. However, the literatures on peace-building and state-building have been 
lacking in their engagement in methodological debates, and thus include some arguments 
regarding international influence in these contexts that do not fully take into account the 
challenges of causal inference. Some of the early, important and influential contributions 
to the state-building literature did not engage in methodological issues,10 and some of the 
recent case study literature has also neglected discussion of the challenges to and 
methods of establishing causal inference.11 Partly as a result, the literature is thus 
somewhat theoretically under-developed, and often fails to specify the causal 
mechanisms that link international missions with their putative legacies.12  
One key problem that is sometimes seen in the literature is simply the conflation of 
correlation with causation, and the assumption, made by virtue of an international 
intervention having taken place, that a particular outcome of interest is the result of 
international action. Beate Jahn, for example, cites the liberal nature of international 
interventionism as the key explanatory factor in accounting for problematic domestic 
politics is a wide range of cases, and in so doing priorities international actors and actions 
as the primary source of domestic political outcomes in these settings. Jahn bases her 
analysis on a broad survey of the political conditions in many cases that have experienced 
international intervention, and asserts, without exploring the detail of each case, that the 
                                                                                                                                      
Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005). For a debate about the optimal strategies for establishing causal 
inference, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Scientific Inference (Princeton University Press, 1994) and Henry E. Brady and David 
Collier (eds), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse tools, shared standards, (Lanham, Md. ; Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). 
10 See Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and 
State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
11 See for example Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (eds), United Nations Interventionism 1991-
2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
12 For similar criticisms relating to the peacekeeping literature, see Virginia Page Fortna, Does 
Peacekeeping Work: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After War (Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.2/3. 
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conditions identified are the result of international rather than domestic factors (and 
specifically the liberal nature of the intervention).13 In other cases, authors have written 
case studies that are too short to allow for a full exploration of causal connections,14 or 
that are overly descriptive and do not explicitly identify the causal mechanisms linking 
international actions to domestic outcomes.15  
A similar problem is present in some efforts to establish the success or failure of 
individual international missions. In some treatments of this issue, the body of discussion 
is given over to the debate concerning the choice of indicators of success and failure, and 
the challenge of making a causal connection between the measures of success and the 
missions being evaluated is given little or no attention. It is often assumed, rather than 
demonstrated, that the domestic conditions being measured with the chosen indicators 
are causally related to the international mission being evaluated. Charles Call’s recent 
evaluation of peace-building missions, for example, scores over twenty UN missions as 
success or failures, but does so without any significant discussion of the causal links 
between the UN’s actions and the outcomes being measured.16 A similar study by 
Zuercher correlates different types of international intervention with a range of 
benchmarks of success in seventeen cases, but also lacks a discussion of causal 
mechanisms that could demonstrate a clear chain of causal responsibility.17 Both Call and 
Zuercher provide excellent discussions of the challenges to selecting appropriate 
indicators of measurement, but neither complements these discussions with 
                                                
13 Beate Jahn, ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, State-building’, 
Journal of Intervention and State-building, Part I, Volume 1, No.1, 87-106; Part II, Volume 1, No.2, 
2007, 211-29. 
14 For example, see Roland Paris, At War’s End. 
15 For example, Berdal and Economides (eds) United Nations Interventionism and Charles T. Call 
and Vanessa Wyeth (eds), Building States to Build Peace, (Lynne Rienner, 2008). 
16 Call, ‘Knowing Peace When You See It’.  
17 Christoph Zuercher, ‘Is More Better? Evaluating External-Led State Building After 1989’, 
CDDRL Working Paper, No.54, 2006. 
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corresponding coverage of the methodological challenges of making causal links between 
the chosen indicators of both dependent and independent variables.  
A problematic by-product of these approaches is that international factors tend to be 
prioritised over domestic factors, and domestic actors and structures are often thus 
marginalised from the causal story. Once the chosen standards of success or failure are 
measured, their value is too quickly attributed to the international presence, and domestic 
variables are often given little attention. In the most extreme cases, characterisations of 
international state-building as occupations or cases of empire tend to prioritise the 
international impact and minimise the role for the independent agency of domestic 
actors,18 who even in the most authoritative of international administration missions have 
retained extensive de facto political authority.19  
It is important to note, however, that these flaws are not found throughout the 
literature and that there are some efforts to discuss methodological issues and to 
incorporate domestic actors into theoretical accounts of international influence. Several 
works on peace-building and state-building include dedicated discussions of 
methodological issues concerning causal inference.20 Miles Kahler has also written of a 
revisionist perspective on state-building that incorporates greater attention to political 
factors beyond international control,21 and there are several theoretically driven accounts 
of peace-building and state-building that seek to combine international and domestic 
                                                
18 See David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building (London: Pluto Press, 2006); 
Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War (London: Polity, 2007). 
19 One the potent role of domestic actors during international administration, see Oisín Tansey, 
Democratic Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration (Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
20 Lise Morje Howard, UN Peacekeeping after Civil Wars (Cambridge University Press, 2008), Doyle 
and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; Paris, At War’s End; and Stedman et al, Ending Civil 
Wars.  
21 Miles Kahler, ‘State-building After Afghanistan and Iraq’, in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, 
The Dilemmas of State-building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (Routledge, 
2009).  
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factors.22 Yet in much of the literature causal claims are frequently made about 
international operations that are not supported by sufficient discussion of the empirical 
evidence, often in ways that over-estimate the extent of international influence. The 
following section examines how the interplay between domestic and actors can be 
examined empirically and demonstrated more rigorously, and highlights the importance 
of locating the chains of political responsibility through the careful selection of 
appropriate research methods.  
 
Identifying Causal Responsibility: Approaches and Tools  
The central argument of this paper is that it is only reasonable to evaluate international 
state-building operations on the basis of the domestic conditions for which they are 
causally responsible. Political responsibility is a vague and contested concept, and there 
are several approaches to the idea of responsibility. Political philosophers make a 
distinction between three types of responsibility:  
- causal responsibility (A is causally responsible for X when A has caused X),  
- moral responsibility (A is morally responsible for X when she is blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for X)  
- responsibility understood as an obligation (A is responsible for X in the sense that 
A has some obligations with regard to X).23 
Evaluations about state-building success and failure tend to entail judgements about both 
causal and moral responsibility. When an individual state-building operation is evaluated 
and held either to be a success or a failure, that evaluation both assumes a causal 
                                                
22 See for example Howard, UN Peacekeeping after Civil Wars; Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and 
Building Peace; and Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher, ‘The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How 
External State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood’ in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The 
Dilemmas of State-building. 
23 This three-part distinction is taken directly from Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska, 
Responsibility and Distributive Justice (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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relationship between the international mission and the domestic conditions on the 
ground (e.g. the mission helped put an end to conflict, or alternatively contributed to the 
outbreak of new conflict) and that the mission should be evaluated with some 
consideration of moral responsibility in mind (e.g. the mission is praised as a success, or 
blamed as a failure).  
The contention here is that establishing causal responsibility is a prior step to 
establishing moral responsibility, and as such those who seek to evaluate the success and 
failure of international intervention missions have a responsibility (as obligation) of their 
own to demonstrate that the judgement is based on a carefully considered and 
empirically supported account of the causal connection between the international actors 
and the domestic conditions that are being used as indicators of success or failure. While 
the literature includes extensive discussions regarding the standards of success or failure 
that should be used, there is much less discussion of the methodological implications of 
linking such standards to the international operations being evaluated. Consequently, the 
risk of conflating correlation with causation, and thus misattributing success or failure, is 
high.  
The central problem can be highlighted with a hypothetical example. Consider a 
small state that has been subject to an extensive UN international state-building mission 
due to its experiences of conflict and state weakness. After three years of involvement, 
the international mission is withdrawn and the country in question is at peace and has re-
established basic levels of state capacity. Consider further that three years after the 
international withdrawal, the country is hit by a devastating hurricane, and much of its 
state infrastructure is destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of people are rendered homeless 
and the economy all but collapses. Food shortages and lack of adequate housing lead to 
civil unrest, opportunistic political leaders mobilize their constituencies along partisan 
lines, and the country steadily descends into a prolonged state of political instability 
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marked by weak institutions, regime instability and civil conflict. Five years after the UN 
international mission has withdrawn, a team of political scientists examines the 
conditions within the country, and on the basis of a set of widely used standards of 
evaluation, declares the original UN operation to have been a failure.  
The example is an exaggerated caricature, but it nonetheless highlights the central 
challenge to evaluating the legacies of state-building. The key obstacle is not one of 
finding agreement on the standards of measurement, but rather of demonstrating that 
what is being evaluated is actually causally related to what is being measured. As the 
fictional example suggests, methodological strategies have to be employed that allow us 
to distinguish between the domestic conditions for which international actors can 
reasonably be said to be causally responsible, and those for which they are not. There are 
several methodological strategies that can be used to achieve such aims, and to enhance 
assessments of international peace-building and state-building operations. Three 
qualitative methodological strategies in particular – counterfactual analysis, process 
tracing and the use of control cases – can be helpful in exploring chains of causality. 
Each of these approaches is well established and well covered in an increasingly broad 
and diverse literature on qualitative methodology.24 However, there is greater scope for 
the incorporation and development of these methodological techniques in certain sectors 
of the state-building literature.  
 
Causal mechanisms and process tracing  
One increasingly prominent avenue for improving causal arguments is to rely on the 
method of within-case analysis, and in particular, process tracing. The process tracing 
                                                
24 For a review, see Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Qualitative Research: Recent 
Developments in Case Study Methods’, Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 9, 2006, pp.455-
476. 
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method was first developed over two decades ago,25 but has been most comprehensively 
outlined and developed in George and Bennett’s influential text, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. At the heart of the Bennett and George approach is a 
concern with developing and testing theory in ways that incorporate attention to the 
causal processes at work in political life, to the causal mechanisms that link causes to effects. 
The authors argue that causal mechanisms are central to causal explanation, and that case 
studies and process tracing are the methods best able to examine the operation of causal 
mechanisms in detail.26 As the authors write:  
 
 
In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, 
interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a 
theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and 
values of the intervening variables in that case.27 
 
The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal 
process – the causal chain and causal mechanism -- between an independent 
variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.28 
 
In cases of major international intervention the boundaries between international and 
domestic action often become blurred, but by using the process tracing method it is at 
least possible to highlight where political developments were generated primarily by 
                                                
25 See Alexander L. George, “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- 
Making Behavior: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System,” in Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., 
Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 95–124; 
Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
Decision Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (JAI Press, 1985), 21-58. 
26 George and Bennett, pp.12, 21. 
27 ibid, p.6. 
28 ibid, p.206. 
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domestic or international actors, or a combination of both. Rather than basing 
conclusions on the existence of international missions and certain outcomes of interest 
(i.e. conclusions that rest on correlation), process tracing focuses on identifying the 
causation behind the correlation and tracing the international influence over time and in 
particular issue areas. Specific causal statements about the impact of international 
missions are therefore strengthened if they are accompanied by an account of the causal 
mechanisms that lead from international action to domestic outcome, and thus 
demonstrate the extent to which international state-building operations are causally 
responsible for the domestic conditions of interest.  
Process tracing has been criticised for being little more than historical narrative, but 
there are ways of ensuring it has theoretical value. Bennett and Elman argue that there 
are four elements to good process tracing. First, the account of events should run from a 
suitably chosen beginning to the end of the story and should not present only a partial 
timeframe taken from a wider process of interest. Second, process tracing accounts that 
have fewer (and preferably no) breaks in the causal story are to be favoured over those 
that have many. Third, any process tracing account will suggest evidence that should be 
found if the account is true, and accounts are thus strong when their key causal links are 
supported by strong evidence. Finally, confidence in specific explanations can be 
increased if process tracing finds evidence that is inconsistent with alternative 
explanations. Even if this evidence doesn’t directly support the causal links being 
advanced, it may nonetheless strengthen the overall account by ruling out competing 
explanations.29 
Many case studies of state-building provide the kind of empirical evidence that is 
perfectly suited to process tracing, but fall short of utilising the method in full due to the 
                                                
29 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study 
Methods’, Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 9, 2006, pp.455-476. 
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absence of any attempt to explore a clearly articulated causal relationship between 
variables and identify a clear set of causal mechanisms. For process tracing to be useful, 
it must be a theoretically driven pursuit that either develops or tests a theoretical 
proposition about the relationship between independent and dependent variables.   
 
 
Counterfactual analysis  
A second way in which to increase confidence in causal statements is through 
counterfactual analysis. Counterfactual strategies involve thought experiments that 
explore what would most likely have taken place if events from the past had transpired 
differently. Their use can help clarify causal arguments, although their application also 
has limited scope given their inherently hypothetical nature. As Lebow summarises, 
‘Counterfactual experiments vary attributes of context or the presence or value of 
variables and analyze how these changes would have affected outcomes. In history and 
political science these outcomes are always uncertain because we can neither predict the 
future nor rerun the tape of history.’30 
The logic of using counterfactual analysis comes from the need to justify a claim that 
a given cause produced a given effect by stating that if the causal factor had been 
different, the outcome would also have been different.31 In other words, any statement 
that X led to Y must also agree with the statement that, all other things being equal, Y 
would not have happened without X. One of the benefits of counterfactual analysis is 
that if the hypothesised alternative is not intuitive or persuasive, it leads one to question 
(and hopefully improve) the original causal argument. Discussions below suggest that the 
                                                
30 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘What's so Different About a Counterfactual?’, World Politics Vol.52, 
No.4, 2000, pp.550-585. 
31 Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, ‘Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics’, 
in Tetlock and Belkin (eds), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological 
and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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use of counterfactual analysis can raise important questions over causal claims made 
about UN legacies in East Timor, and including the proposition that the international 
mission contributed to the emergence of a one-party political system.  
However, while counterfactuals can be useful, there are also some limits to their 
potential. Tetlock and Belkin identify a number of factors that strengthen the nature of 
counterfactual analysis, and suggest some counterfactual strategies to avoid. They argue 
that all elements of the counterfactual should be clearly and explicitly defined, so that 
assessment of changes in one variable can be more easily ‘measured’ in the hypothetical 
scenario. They also argue that there should be logical consistency in the proposed 
relationship between variables, and that this relationship is also consistent with existing 
theory on the subject matter. Importantly, they also emphasise the need to make minimal 
and plausible alterations to the historical record in order to explore the alternative 
possibilities. Large-scale changes to history may be interesting as thought experiments, 
but they change so many variables that it becomes hard to make plausible causal 
arguments.32 Counterfactual analysis has been used sparingly in research on international 
interventions, but Downs and Stedman highlight its key contributions in evaluating 
international peace implementation missions, and show how the use of counterfactual 
analysis can lead to individual cases been reclassified as successes or failures.33 
 
The Use of Control Cases 
A final strategy that can be used is to select cases carefully in order to increase the 
strength of the causal arguments. Case selection is a major point of discussion in the 
qualitative methodology literature, and there are varying recommendations concerning 
the optimal strategy. One of the most influential prescriptions is not to select cases on 
                                                
32 Tetlock and Belkin, ‘Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics’. 
33 See Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, pp.50-52. The authors 
use counterfactual analysis on 16 cases of peace implementation and find that two of the 16 
required reclassification as successes or failures as a result.  
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the dependent variable – that is, not to select cases that all have the same outcome of 
interest.34 For example, this recommendation suggests it would be inadvisable to explain 
the causes of civil war with reference only to cases that have experienced civil wars. If 
this approach is taken, it is impossible to know if the purported causes of civil war were 
not also present in cases where war did not break out. If they were, the strength of the 
causal explanation would be considerably weakened.  
A separate concern exists regarding the selection of cases that all have the same or 
similar levels of the independent variable of interest. If all cases have the causal variable 
of interest, and an argument is made about that variable’s effect across the cases, it will 
not be possible to be certain that the same outcome did not also emerge in cases without 
the causal variable of interest. For example, Roland Paris’ study of post-conflict peace-
building avoids the first problem above by examining a series of cases of international 
peace-building that resulted in both renewed conflict and sustained peace.35 Paris is not 
selecting on the dependent variable, as the cases include variation on the question of war 
recurrence. But he is selecting cases based on the independent variable, as all his cases 
experienced some form of international peace-building operation. There is no way of 
knowing, therefore, if the problems of instability that Paris associated with international 
peace-building did not also exist in cases where there was no attempt at liberal peace-
building. Virginia Page Fortna has criticised the peace-building literature for this lack of 
comparison of peace-building cases with non-peace-building cases, and in her recent 
work has incorporated cases where peace-builders were never deployed into both her 
qualitative and quantitative analysis.36 
The point here is not that any work that does not include control cases is inherently 
flawed, or that the literature has completely ignored this issue – it has not. Rather, the 
                                                
34 See especially, Barbara Geddes, ‘How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: 
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics’, Political Analysis, Vol.2, No.1, 1990, pp.131-150. 
35 Paris, At War’s End. 
36 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work. 
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aim is to identify one further avenue by which case study analyses of international peace-
building and state-building can strengthen their causal claims and develop more robust 
assessments of the domestic conditions that international missions are causally 
responsible for, and the legacies that they leave in their wake. These issues are addressed 
in some sectors of the literature, but are not acknowledged and taken into account as 
much as they could be.  
The remainder of this article explores the issues raised above with reference to the 
case of East Timor, which has experienced successive UN missions since the late 1990s. 
The following sections explore existing arguments about the legacies of UNTAET, 
highlight problems with those arguments based in particular on their lack of attention to 
the causal chains of responsibility, and demonstrate the ways in which attention to 
process tracing, causal mechanisms and consideration of counterfactual scenarios can 
clarify the true legacies of international state-building efforts.  
 
 
 
Evaluating International Legacies in East Timor  
East Timor has been host to a series of international missions, and from 1999-2002 was 
subject to one of the most authoritative state-building operations in recent years, the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).37 A former 
Portuguese colony, East Timor was annexed by Indonesia in 1975 and ruled as an 
occupied territory from Jakarta until the late 1990s. However, after the East Timorese 
people voted overwhelming for independence in a 1999 referendum, intense Indonesian-
sponsored violence erupted and the UN deployed an initial military force (INTERFET) 
                                                
37 UNTAET was immediately followed by a successor mission, UNMISET, the UN Mission of 
Support in East Timor. UNMISET itself was followed by a smaller support mission, the United 
Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which in August 2006, and as a response to the 2006 
crisis, was succeeded by the more robust UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).  
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followed by a large-scale administration mission, UNTAET.38 In late 1999, UNTAET 
replaced all authorities that previously had claims to the territory, including both Portugal 
and Indonesia, and East Timor officially came under the control of the UN. What 
followed was one of the most authoritative state-building missions in recent history. 
Established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNTAET was empowered with 
overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and the exercise of all 
legislative and executive authority, and was mandated to deal with a wide range of 
security, political and economic issues.39 
By the time UNTAET withdrew in May 2002, fundamental change had taken place 
in the East Timorese political context. The key issue of East Timor’s status was resolved, 
with independence finally guaranteed and recognised internationally, while political 
violence had ceased to be an immediate concern and a nascent democratic political 
regime had been put in place.40 In May 2002, it thus seemed as if East Timor had made 
significant progress towards a successful political transition, and a widespread view 
developed that it had been one of the UN’s most successful missions. The UN praised 
its own achievements in East Timor,41 and several academic analyses also declared the 
UN missions as successful. Doyle and Sambanis classed UNTAET as a commendable 
UN success, suggesting that the international mission prepared Timor well for 
independence and demonstrated what the right mandate could achieve when combined 
                                                
38 For the political history of East Timor in the years before UN intervention, see Peter Carey 
and G. Cater Bentley, (eds), East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation (New York: Social 
Science Research Council, 1995).  
39 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272, S/RES/1272, 25 October 1999. 
40 For treatments of the UNTAET years, see Simon Chesterman, ‘East Timor in Transition: Self-
Determination, State-building, and the United Nations’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.1, 
2002, pp.45-76 and Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International 
State-building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) Chapter 5. 
41 See BBC News, ‘E Timor independence: Annan's speech’, 20 May 2002, www.news.bbc.co.uk 
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with sufficient resources.42 Similarly, Lise Morje Howard includes East Timor as one of 
several successful UN operations in her comparative study of post-war peacekeeping.43  
Yet not all commentators were so positive, and two issues in particular led to critical 
evaluations of the UN legacy.44 The first issue concerned a perceived drift towards 
authoritarian politics within East Timor. As the primary political movement behind the 
resistance to the Indonesian occupation, the political party FRETILIN (Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor) was in a position to translate its profile and 
popularity into electoral success in the wake of the Indonesian withdrawal. By gaining 55 
of the 88 seats in the first Constituent Assembly elections of 2001, FRETILIN held 
sufficient power to dominate the assembly’s business, and subsequently raised concerns 
about its democratic credentials.45 The second issue concerned the fragility of East 
Timor’s state structures, which was most clearly revealed in 2006, when a rebellion in the 
armed forces developed into a generalised breakdown of law and order and near collapse 
of state authority. The crisis prompted a change of government, the deployment of a 
new Australian and New Zealand-led International Stabilization Force, and the 
establishment of a new UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The remainder of this article addresses two separate 
arguments that have been made about the perceived legacies of the UN presence in these 
                                                
42 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, pp.198/9, 255/6. 
43 Howard, UN Peacekeeping after Civil Wars. 
44 The two sets of arguments explored here do not represent the full range of criticisms of the 
UN presence in East Timor. For others, see Jarat Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom in East Timor’, 
Survival, Vol.42, No.3, 2000; Tanja Hohe, ‘The Clash of Paradigms: International Administration 
and Local Political Legitimacy in East Timor’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 24, Number 3, 
December 2002, pp.569-589. 
45 For some critical commentary on the FRETILIN government’s legislative record on civil and 
political rights, see Freedom House, ‘Countries at the Crossroads 2010: Country Report - East 
Timor’. Available at freedomhouse.org.  
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areas, and uses process tracing and counterfactual analysis to raise questions over existing 
evaluations of the UN’s legacies in East Timor.46  
 
An Authoritarian Legacy? Questioning the UN’s electoral impact 
One argument that seeks to hold the UN presence causally responsible for some of the 
perceived ills of the East Timorese state suggests that the UN facilitated the emergence 
of a dominant one-party system that featured elements of authoritarian rule. East 
Timor’s 2001 elections were held during UNTAET’s tenure, and led to the election of 
FRETILIN as the largest political party with 55 out of 88 seats in the then Constituent 
Assembly, which subsequently became the first parliament of the independent state. For 
some, FRETILIN’s dominance was partly the result of the UN mission itself, which was 
alleged to have facilitated its extensive victory.47 According to Peter Carey, ‘political 
parties were allowed to re-emerge and this opened the way for FRETILIN dominance of 
the legislative process...Far from seeding democracy, the UN ushered in a one-party 
state’.48 
Similarly, Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks argue that democracy was undermined 
‘even under UN guidance’.49 According to the authors:  
 
“The outcome has been an unrepresentative and dictatorial state government. This 
familiar occurrence represents both a failure of the internationals, who were 
                                                
46 As the empirical contribution of this article is focused only on one case, it is not appropriate in 
this instance to explore the strategy of employing control cases discussed above.  
47 Simon Chesterman, ‘East Timor’ in Berdal and Economides, United Nations Interventionism, 
p.215. 
48 See Peter Carey with Pat Walsh, ‘The Security Counil and the Question of East Timor’, in 
Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum (eds), The United Nations 
Security Council and War The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945; and Peter Carey, ‘East 
Timor: Sectarian Violence and the Challenge of Nation-building’, 31 January 2007, The Word, 
available at: http://www.theword.ie/cms/publish/article_500.shtml  
49 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, ‘Liberal Peace-building in Timor Leste: The Emperor’s 
New Clothes?’ International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.2, 2008, p.194. 
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desperate for a positive result and early exit, and of local elites, who failed to 
implement an inclusive, power-sharing approach. Yet, clearly, the major local actor 
was provided with the authority to circumvent democracy by marginalizing other actors and 
instituting a one-party regime.”50 
 
Richmond and Franks’s analysis, however, is flawed on two counts. First, it exaggerates 
the anti-democratic nature of the actions that Fetilin pursued. By suggesting that 
FRETILIN ‘stage[d] a ‘palace coup’, albeit under the auspices of a democratic election, 
to ensure its domination of political power’, the authors stretch the meaning of the idea 
of coup beyond breaking point. Similarly, by citing as another indicator of FRETILIN’s 
anti-democratic tendencies its move to give itself ‘a stranglehold over the state by 
assigning most key cabinet positions to party members’,51 Oliver and Franks present as 
malign a practice that is normally accepted as convention in parliamentary democracies: 
the right of the government to appoint the cabinet from among the ranks of the ruling 
party. Their criticism also neglects to acknowledge that FRETILIN’s first post-election 
cabinet had many non-party members.52 
Second, the authors share with Carey the view that the development of a perceived 
one-party regime in East Timor was partly a legacy of the United Nations, which allowed 
and ushered in a form of authoritarian rule. However, there are two problems with this 
analysis which directly correspond to the fallacies discussed earlier in the article. First, the 
respective authors do not clearly specify the causal connections that link UN actions to 
the election outcome. Oliver and Franks point to two factors relating to the UN that 
affected the situation. First, they observe that the UN did not recognize Timor’s pro-
independence coalition movement, the CNRT, as its main partner in East Timor when it 
                                                
50 Emphasis added – although the authors are not explicit here, the clear implication is that 
FRETILIN was provided the authority to undermine democracy by the UN. 
51 Oliver and Franks, ‘Liberal Peace-building in Timor Leste’ p.192 
52 See Tansey, Regime-Building, pp.75/6. 
 23 
arrived,53 and that this ‘allowed’ the CNRT to develop its own parallel political structures 
on the ground that were later hijacked by FRETILIN.54 But the causal chain here does 
not clearly show why or how the UN mission facilitated FRETILIN’s use of CNRT’s 
political structures, and nor does it account for the fact that FRETILIN, as the historic 
pro-independence party of East Timor, had its own well developed party structures 
independent of the CNRT. Second, they suggest the UN’s desire for results and an early 
exit contributed to the situation,55 although again it is not made explicit how this affected 
domestic politics. The timing of the elections is not explicitly connected to the election 
outcome with reference to any evidence that would suggest a causal chain.  Both 
arguments thus fail to provide a sufficiently clear account of how the UN’s actions 
ultimately affected the domestic political outcomes that have been identified, and the 
causal chain is unclear as a result. As discussed above, a greater emphasis on the causal 
mechanisms involved, supported by the use of process tracing to provide a fuller account 
of the causal chain, would provide a superior causal story that would lend more support 
to the final evaluation being presented.  
Such an approach suggests that the causal story that led to the dominant 
performance of FRETILIN in the 2001 elections is not one that contains a significant 
role for the UN. Certainly UNTAET played a major role in East Timorese politics in 
general during the pre-election period, but the dominant electoral results achieved by 
FRETILIN have much more to do with domestic political dynamics than they do with 
the international presence. A closer examination of the political competition in the run-
up to the election, as well as the occupation-era resistance period, suggests that 
                                                
53 The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) was an umbrella coalition representing 
almost all of the political parties in the territory, as well as the Catholic Church, and had a firmly 
pro-independence stance. 
54 Oliver and Franks, ‘Liberal Peace-building in Timor Leste’, p.192. A similar point is made by 
Edith Bowles and Tanja Chopra, ‘East Timor: State-building Revisited’, in Charles T. Call and 
Vanessa Wyeth (eds), Building States to Build Peace, (Lynne Rienner, 2008). 
55 Oliver and Franks, ‘Liberal Peace-building in Timor Leste’, p.194. 
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FRETILIN was always likely to perform well in any open electoral contest in Timor, and 
that the UN had little role to play in shaping inter-party competition between 1999 and 
2001. Despite suggestions that the UN somehow ushered in a one-party system, it was 
FRETILIN popular support and organizational advantages than guaranteed its successes 
against its rival parties. 
A key point here is that the dissolution of the CNRT was effectively inevitable. As 
an umbrella group of disparate political parties, the CNRT’s principal point of political 
cohesion was the struggle for independence.56 Once independence was within sight and 
elections were called, personal and ideological disagreements arose that reflected long-
standing political divisions among the Timorese elite.57 At the outset of the resistance 
against Indonesian occupation, FRETILIN became the central actor of the political 
resistance and its paramilitary wing FALINTIL (Armed Forces for the National 
Liberation of East Timor) led the armed resistance. However, in the 1980s Xanana 
Gusmão became the leader of the armed resistance, and began a process of military and 
political reorganisation that would leave enduring legacies. Gusmão distanced himself 
from the Marxist revolutionary ideology of much of the FRETILIN leadership, including 
Timor’s first post-independence Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, and sought instead to 
emphasise the need for national unity and democracy. In 1986 he helped establish and 
became President of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM – replaced in 
1998 by the CNRT), which sought to present a united front against Indonesian 
occupation and included a coalition of Timorese parties with civil society groups. In 
                                                
56 Sarah Niner, ‘A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of CNRT’ in Richard 
Tanter, Mark Selden and Stephen R. Shalom, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and 
the World Community (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001). See also Dionisio Babo Soares, 
‘Political Developments Leading to The Referendum’ in James F. Fox and Dionísio Babo Soares, 
Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 
2000).  
57 See Geoffrey Robinson, ‘With UNAMET in East Timor: An Historian’s Perspective’, in 
Richard Tanter, Mark Selden and Stephen R. Shalom, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, 
Indonesia and the World Community (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
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1987, Gusmão sought to further decouple the resistance movement from the FRETILIN 
party, as he publicly rejected the Marxist ideology of FRETILIN and, within a year, 
removed FALINTIL from organisational control of the party.58 The legacies of this rift 
with FRETILIN were still being felt after 1999,59 and few observers felt that Xanana 
Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri would be willing to work together in a unity government led 
by the CNRT.60 
Once the Indonesian forces had departed, these divisions quickly led to tensions 
within the CNRT coalition. The struggle between Xanana Gusmão’s wish for a CNRT 
national unity movement and the political parties’ wish for autonomy came to a head in 
during a contentious CNRT Congress held in Dili in August 2000, in which FRETILIN 
voted against many of the tabled resolutions.61 FRETILIN was particularly unhappy with 
the results of leadership elections at the Congress, in which Xanana Gusmão was elected 
as President and José Ramos-Horta and Mario Carrascalão were elected as Vice-
Presidents. Senior FRETILIN figures such as Mari Alkatiri and Francisco ‘Lu Olo’ 
Guterres were shut out from the leadership, and the party withdrew from CNRT in 
protest shortly after the Congress.62 The CNRT itself dissolved before the 2001 elections, 
and its demise thus had much more to do with internal political rivalries than any policy 
of the UN.  
Similarly, in the post-CNRT environment the political dominance of FRETILIN is 
more attributable to its own history and record rather than through any intervention of 
the UNTAET mission. Once FRETILIN withdrew from CNRT, it could rely on its own 
                                                
58 For a full outline of the evolution of the resistance, see Chega! The Report of the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), especially Part 5: Resistance: Structure and 
Strategy. Available at www.cavr-timorleste.org  
59 See Dennis Shoesmith, ‘Timor-Leste: Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System’ Asian 
Survey, Vol.XLIII, No.2, March/April 2003, pp.231-252. 
60 Interviews with José Teixera and senior UN officials, Dili, September 2010. 
61 Babo-Soares, Dionísio. ‘Successes, Weaknesses and Challenges: A Critical Overview of the 
Political Transition in East Timor’, Council for Asia Europe Co-operation Conference, October, 
2001. 
62 Ibid, and interview with José Teixera, senior FRETILIN MP, Dili, September 2010. 
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long-standing political structures within Timor, as well as its unique position in the 
country as the only political party with a long-standing pro-independence stance.63 
FRETILIN was the party most closely associated with the independence struggle and 
thus had a cachet that could not be matched by its rivals. In the new political context in 
Timor, FRETILIN thus stood out as the CNRT waned. Although new political parties 
also emerged to challenge FRETILIN during 2000 and 2001, they lacked historical roots 
of any kind and were thus seeking to establish themselves as political movements over a 
relatively short period of time before the elections. Political parties such as the 
Democratic Party (PD) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) were entirely new 
creations, and even though they received significant attention and some high profile 
support, including from Xanana Gusmão, they could not match FRETILIN in terms of 
organisational structure or leadership recognition.64 Furthermore, the decision of Xanana 
Gusmão not to create a new political party and to focus instead on winning the 
Presidency facilitated FRETILIN’s subsequent success, as he was one of the few political 
leaders who could have mobilised a significant challenge to FRETILIN at this time.65 
Consequently, the causal chain the leads to the outcome of the 2001 elections is not 
one that contains a significant role for the UN. The political and personal differences 
within the CNRT ensured that it lacked the cohesion to continue as a unified political 
force once the Indonesian occupation had ended, after which FRETILIN assumed a 
dominant position that had much more to do with its role as the primary pro-
independence political movement than any international contribution. The questionable 
nature of assertions that the UN contributed significantly to the outcome of the 2001 
                                                
63 Multiple Timorese interviewees during a fieldwork trip to Dili in September 2010 cited 
FRETILIN’s historic record as Timor’s pro-independence party and its long-standing 
organisational structures as principal reasons for its electoral success in 2001.   
64 For profiles of Timor’s political parties at this time, see Pat Walsh, ‘East Timor's Political 
Parties And Groupings’, Australian Council for Overseas Aid, April 2001.  
65 Xanana Gusmão ultimately did create a political party in 2007, also named the CNRT. The new 
party went on to become the second largest party in Timor in the 2007 parliamentary elections, 
delivering Xanana Gusmão the Prime Ministership of a coalition government in the process.  
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elections can also be established through the use of counterfactual analysis. The 
suggestion that UNTAET contributed to the size of FRETILIN’s victory only holds if it 
is also plausible that FRETILIN would have done less well in the 2001 elections if 
UNTAET had been absent. While it is impossible to predict election results in a 
hypothetical moment in the past, I argue that it is difficult to imagine FRETILIN doing 
less well in East Timor’s 2001 elections even without the UN presence (holding all other 
things equal). As outlined above, there is little evidence to suggest that the party owed its 
success to the UN, and counterfactual possibilities do not suggest a substantially 
different election result. On the contrary, had the UN not been present during the 
transitional period, it is possible that FRETILIN would have had an even greater victory 
in the polls because the electoral system would likely have been different. One of the 
effects that the UNTAET mission did have during the transition period was to 
encourage local leaders to select a mixed electoral system that included a major 
proportional representation element, even though FRETILIN favoured a majoritarian 
system.66 Had a majoritarian system been selected, FRETILIN would have significantly 
increased their parliamentary presence. An indicator of this probability is that among the 
13 seats that were elected according to a majoritarian first-past-the-post system in East 
Timor’s districts, FRETILIN won 12.67 Had that pattern been replicated in a purely 
majoritarian system for all seats, FRETILIN truly would have dominated Timorese 
politics with nearly total representation in the assembly. Consideration of the 
counterfactual scenario thus suggests that causal claims linking the UN state-building 
mission to the emergence of a dominant, and authoritarian, one-party system in East 
Timor are wide of the mark.  
                                                
66 Tansey, Regime-Building pp.86/7, and Simon Chesterman, ‘East Timor in Transition: Self-
Determination, State-Building, and the United Nations’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 1, 
2002, pp. 45–76. 
67 For a discussion of the 2001 election results, see Anthony L. Smith, ‘East Timor: Elections in 
the World's Newest Nation’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 2, April 2004, pp. 145-159. 
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The 2006 Crisis: Locating the Chain of Responsibility  
A second argument regarding the legacies of state-building in East Timor concerns a 
crisis that broke out in 2006 and its implications for how the UN missions should be 
evaluated. As discussed above, in the years after independence was granted in 2002 East 
Timor was initially viewed by many as a success case for the UN. However, events in 
2006 highlighted serious weaknesses in East Timor’s state structures and led some to 
reassess the impact of the UN presence. The crisis began in January 2006 when a group 
of soldiers submitted a petition to the President and the head of the army alleging 
systematic discrimination within the army against soldiers from the western part of the 
country by those from the east. Several hundred ‘petitioners’ left their posts, and after 
some weeks, the protesters were dismissed by the head of the army. Subsequent 
demonstrations became violent, and the situation deteriorated during early 2006 into a 
generalised breakdown of law and order, entailing the near disintegration of both the 
armed forces and the police, as well as the death of 38 people and the displacement of 
approximately 150,000. The crisis culminated in the resignation of Mari Alkatiri as Prime 
Minister, as well as the Ministers for Defence and Interior, and the deployment of a new 
Australian-led peacekeeping force, ISF, and a new UN mission (UNMIT) that was 
mandated to oversee security and political development.68 
The 2006 crisis led to a reappraisal of international state-building efforts in East 
Timor, and some recent evaluations have been more critical of the UN legacy.69 One of 
                                                
68 See UN Security Council Resolution 1704, 25 August 2006. For the UN’s own account of the 
crisis and its causes, see ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1690 (2006)’, S/2006/628, 8 August 2006. 
69 For example, see Edith Bowles and Tanja Chopra, ‘East Timor: State-building Revisited’, in 
Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (eds), Building States to Build Peace, (Lynne Rienner, 2008). 
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the clearest examples comes in Charles Call’s recent evaluation of a range of UN peace-
building missions, in which Call concludes that the need for a new peacekeeping mission 
after the wake of the 2006 crisis in East Timor requires that the initial UN presence 
should be viewed as a peace-building failure.70 However, there are problems with 
evaluations such as these that attribute responsibility for the 2006 crisis to the UN unless 
they can clearly show how the chain of responsibility links UN actions to the violent 
events. As discussed above, it is not appropriate to evaluate any international mission 
with reference to particular outcomes unless it can be established that the mission is in 
some way responsible for those outcomes. Although Call provides a thorough discussion 
of his choice of standards, his approach fails to establish empirically whether the 
standards of success being measured are actually causally related to the missions that are 
being evaluated. Even if the individual standards may be measured to perfection, without 
some evidence that those indicators are actually related in some way to the mission being 
evaluated, the exercise is inherently limited.  
With respect to the 2006 crisis and its implications for evaluations of the UN 
presence in East Timor, identifying a chain of causal responsibility linking the UN to the 
crisis is far from clear-cut. The 2006 crisis had multiple and complex causes, and an 
examination of the process leading up to the crisis suggests that it may be too simplistic 
to treat the crisis as a failure of the UN. There are a wide range of contributing causes of 
the crisis, including both the proximate causes that played a role in the period 
immediately prior to the emergence of the crisis itself, as well as a number of deeper 
underlying causes related to the structural features of East Timorese politics and society. 
Among these latter structural causes are the legacies of Portuguese and Indonesian 
                                                
70 Call, ‘Knowing Peace When You See It’. 
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occupation which created lasting political divisions within East Timor,71 deep socio-
economic inequalities associated with poverty, lack of development and a large youth 
population,72 and an acute land ownership problem created by a history of forced internal 
displacement coupled with multiple and competing property ownership regimes.73 By 
2006, many of the high expectations associated with independence four years earlier had 
also been disappointed, as initial aspirations and optimism had given way to increasing 
frustrations with the realities of limited development, overseen by a Mari Alkatiri-led 
government that was increasingly perceived as corrupt and unresponsive.74 
However, while these underlying factors were no doubt important in setting the 
context for the 2006 crisis, the violence that erupted was by no means structurally 
determined. Rather, it occurred due to the actions and interactions of identifiable 
individuals and groups, and unfolded progressively over a number of months that 
contained several critical junctures that directed events towards the violent outcome that 
occurred. The remainder of this section thus focuses primarily on these elite and group 
dynamics, and explores the key decisions that were made that contributed to the crisis.  
In seeking to identify the causal chain leading to the final outcome, it can be helpful 
to distinguish between two stages of the crisis. The first is the emergence of discontent 
with the armed forces and the rise to prominence of the petitioners. The second 
concerns the subsequent trajectory of events related to the petitioners, in which an army 
protest degenerated into a generalized breakdown of law and order across the state. 
While the UN can quite easily be implicated in the first phase, particularly due to the 
                                                
71 See Peter Carey ‘East Timor: Sectarian Violence and the Challenge of Nation-building’ The 
Word, available at http://www.theword.ie/cms/publish/article_500.shtml   
72 Matthew B. Arnold ‘Who is My Friend, Who is My Enemy'? Youth and State-building in 
Timor-Leste', International Peacekeeping,16:3, 2009, 379-392. 
73 James Scambary, ‘Anatomy of a conflict: the 2006 – 2007 communal violence in East Timor’, 
Conflict, Security & Development, 9:2 June 2009; Andrew Harrington, ‘Ethnicity, Violence, & Land 
and Property Disputes in Timor-Leste’, East Timor Law Journal, 2, 2007.  
74 Richard Curtain, ‘Crisis in Timor-Leste: Looking Beyond the Surface Reality for Causes and 
Solutions’, Australian National University: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project 
Working Paper, 2006/1.   
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oversight role it held when the newly-created Defence Forces of East Timor (F-FDTL) 
and National Police Force of East Timor (PNTL) were established, the transformation 
from an army crisis into a state crisis is one that is almost exclusively the result of 
domestic rather than international dynamics. The causal chain linking UN actions to 
political outcomes in 2006 thus essentially stops at a relatively early stage of the crisis. 
Similarly, consideration of a counterfactual scenario suggests how the crisis might have 
been avoided, not through alternative international action, but rather through alternative 
action by national politicians and officials.  
 
From Protest to Crisis: Identifying the Causal Chain  
The first stage of the crisis involved the emergence of the petitioners and their 
demonstrations against perceived discrimination within the armed forces. For many 
observers, the grievances of the petitioners were inextricably linked to the manner in 
which the armed forces were established, and in particular the methods by which its 
soldiers were recruited from the ranks of the resistance army, FALINTIL. During the 
UN administration, it was decided that a new national army should be created, the F-
FDTL. Recruitment for the defence forces proved controversial, however, and it has 
been suggested that Xanana Gusmão persuaded UNTAET to allow Falantil to oversee 
the process.75 In the initial phase of recruitment, F-FDTL’s ranks were primarily filled 
with Falantil veterans, and particularly those from the east of the country where the 
resistance had remained strongest throughout the Indonesian occupation. In a move that 
would lay the foundation for future divisions, subsequent recruits were predominantly 
comprised of young Timorese without a background in Falantil, many of whom were 
from the west of the country. For some, this process undermined the integrity of the 
                                                
75 See the Report of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, October 
2006, para 25. 
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security services and reflected flawed UN oversight. According to Ludovic Hood, the 
UN ‘essentially absconded’ from its obligations to oversee development of the defence 
force, and failed to provide or ensure proper civilian oversight. The UN’s lack of 
oversight of the recruitment procedures for F-FDTL facilitated politicization of the 
process and set a poor precedent for civilian oversight of the armed forces, which 
remained weak in subsequent years.76 Consequently, it can be argued that the UN can be 
linked with the emergence of the fissures that triggered the crisis, and thus shares some 
responsibility for its emergence.  
However, it is also the case that the crisis itself did not unfold as a direct result of the 
emergence of the petitioners. Rather, the early army protests only degenerated into a full-
scale political and security sector crisis during a second stage of events in which the 
security forces began to disintegrate and law and order broke down among the civilian 
population. Arguably, these latter developments only took place as a result of the 
mishandling of the initial petitioner protests by the Timorese political elite, which made 
crucial decisions that served to raise rather than diffuse tensions. Three decisions in 
particular helped contribute to the emergence of a wider crisis of the state after the 
petitioner protests emerged.  
The first decision was one of the most significant moments in the episode, and 
involved the initial dismissal of the petitioners on 16 March 2006. In the days after the 
petition was first delivered, an effort was made to deal with the grievances through the 
establishment of a commission of inquiry. However, these efforts quickly failed, in part 
because the commission included army members named by the petitioners as among 
those carrying out the alleged discrimination. Subsequent interventions by the President 
also failed to achieve any settlement, and after the numbers of petitioners had swelled 
                                                
76 Ludovic Hood, ‘Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999 – 2004’, International Peacekeeping, 
Vol.13, No.1, March 2006, pp.60 – 77.  
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and were refusing to return to their barracks, the Chief of the Defence Forces dismissed 
594 soldiers, a number that amounted to over a third of the total number of F-FDTL 
members. According to the head of the F-FDTL, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, 
the decision to dismiss the soldiers was the only option available: ‘we had given them 
every chance. What else could I do?’77 The decision was also made with the support of 
Prime Minister Alkatiri, who spoke in favour of the dismissal, and has been criticised for 
being heavy-handed and insular throughout this period.78 However, President Gusmão 
was not involved in the decision and heavily criticised the move (see below). There has 
also been criticism that the dismissal decision was taken without due process, and that it 
heightened tensions when other actions might have helped resolve the dispute. The 
Independent Special Commission of Inquiry into the crisis lamented the lack of any 
procedure for processing and redressing grievances within the F-FDTL, and criticised 
the armed forces for the timing and nature of the dismissals. Suggesting that the dispute 
might have been resolved with a swifter and more comprehensive to address the 
grievances of the petitioners, the Commission concluded ‘the discharge decision 
undertaken without appropriate procedures contributed significantly to the build-up of 
tension and highlighted significant institutional weaknesses’.79 The decision was thus 
clearly a critical juncture in the transition that took place from army protests to state-
wide crisis.  
A second critical intervention took place when President Gusmão gave a televised 
speech in response to the dismissals on 23 March. In the speech, the President 
acknowledged that the decision was legal and made clear that his intention was not to 
undo it. However, he also described it as incorrect and unjust, and criticised the 
                                                
77 ICG, ‘Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis’, Asia Report N°120, 10 October 2006, p.8. 
78 Michael J. Butler, ‘Ten Years After: (Re)Assessing Neo-Trusteeship and UN State-building in 
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79 Report of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, October 2006, 
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dismissals for focusing on military discipline rather than looking at the roots of the 
problem that petitioners were raising.80 Crucially, the speech also included an outline of 
the petitioners’ arguments regarding discrimination within the army that included 
quotations from the original petition. The president called on the army to address the 
behaviour of veterans of FALINTIL within the F-FDTL and to ensure that they were 
not provided with a special status.  
The speech had two important implications. First, by repeating the petitioners’ claims 
it gave national attention to the idea of east/west divisions and discrimination within the 
army. In essence, the President had taken the manner in which the petitioners had 
framed a security-sector dispute and given it national prominence. Second, the speech 
also appeared to legitimise the petitioners’ allegations, as the President’s decision to 
quote directly from the petition suggested his approval of their grievances and his 
opposition to the stance of Prime Minister.81 In the immediate aftermath of the speech, 
rates of inter-communal violence in East Timor spiked and also took on a distinctly 
regional character, in which groups formed around either ‘eastern’ or ‘western’ identities 
and clashed along regional lines. According to some, the speech played a direct role in 
inflaming the situation and contributing to increased rates of inter-communal violence.82  
A third key decision took place on April 28, the final day of a week-long series of 
protests held by the petitioners outside the government building in Dili. During the 
course of the demonstrations, the petitioners had been joined by youth groups who 
sympathised with the petitioners but who also had separate grievances against the 
government. On 28 April, the numbers of protestors rose and violence broke out; the 
                                                
80 Speech by Xanana Gusmao, 23 March 2006, available at: 
http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/reports/2006/east-timor-military  
81 ICG, ‘Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis’. 
82 Interview with UN and national officials, Dili, September 2010. According to the director of a 
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government buildings were attacked, police officers fled and the violence led to two 
civilians deaths and several injuries. During the course of the day, and in response to the 
collapse in the PNTL’s policing abilities, the Prime Minister called in the F-FDTL to deal 
with the petitioners, and both the army and police sought to keep order during the 
course of the night.83 However, the decision to use the F-FDTL to clamp down on the 
petitioner protests proved highly controversial, both in terms of the constitutional 
legality of the order and of the political implications on the ground. The use of the 
remaining members of the F-FDTL to clamp down on the petitioners who had been 
dismissed helped reinforce the east/west divisions that had become increasingly resonant 
in the wider Timorese community and directly prompted a further army split that would 
have long-term consequences. Within days of the deployment of the F-FDTL, the 
Commander of the Military Police, Alfredo Reinado, left his post in protest at the use of 
the F-FDTL against the petitioners and created a new armed movement that was to go 
on to have several violent clashes with both the F-FDTL and the police force.84 The 
military deployment also antagonised the relationship between the army and the police, 
and subsequent violent clashes between the PNTL and F-FDTL became some of the 
worst of the crisis.85 The decision to deploy the F-FDTL thus contributed to an 
escalation of the crisis and exacerbated the political tensions within the public and the 
political class. The President had not been informed of the decision, the legality of the 
decision was contested and the aggressive nature of the F-FDTL patrols fuelled tensions 
in the streets.86   
                                                
83 Report of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, October 2006, 
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These decisions each contributed significantly and cumulatively to the development 
of the crisis in 2006, and were each critical points in the causal chain leading from the 
initial emergence of the petitioners’ protests to the worst of the violence that took place 
in April and May and that prompted the deployment of a renewed international 
peacekeeping force. The entirety of the 2006 Crisis can not be understood without 
appreciation of both deep-rooted structural causes as well as the more elite-level factors 
emphasised here. However, highlighting the key decision points in early 2006 
demonstrates the crucial role of national-level decision-makers, and raises questions over 
assessments that identify the crisis as a failure of the UN. Considering how the initial 
army grievances might have been handled differently also suggests that this ‘UN failure’ 
could have been avoided with alternative national level policies.  
 
Avoiding the Worst: Exploring the counterfactual  
The complex causal chain presented above also suggests ways in which counterfactual 
analysis can be used to clarify the causes of the crisis. By considering a hypothetical 
scenario in which some of the purported causes of the civil conflict are altered or 
removed, it becomes possible to gain some analytical leverage on their relative weight.  
First, considering alternative policies and practices by the UN missions in East Timor 
highlights the ways in which they might share some responsibility for the 2006 crisis. 
One of the arguments that links the UN to the crisis concerns its limited oversight of the 
recruitment process for the F-FDTL. Consideration of a counterfactual case regarding 
this action does suggest a plausible alternative scenario in which the UNTAET mission 
actively sought to ensure an equal balance among eastern and western recruits in the first 
F-FDTL battalion, as well as a balance between young recruits and veteran FALINTIL 
fighters. Such a policy may have helped reduce the chances for the emergence of 
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factional tensions within armed forces, and may have removed the central trigger of the 
subsequent crisis, namely the emergence of the petitioners.  
However, as suggested above, the divisions within the F-FDTL were not sufficient 
for the outbreak of the crisis itself, which was rather the result of a combination of those 
divisions, the emergence of the petitioners and, crucially, the handling of the petitioner 
protests. Exploring alternative scenarios that might have taken place after the petitioner 
protests began thus gives a better a sense of how the crisis itself might have been 
avoided. Although a comprehensive counterfactual exploration of multiple alternative 
scenarios is beyond the scope of this article, it can quickly be established that had each of 
the three key political decisions explored above been handled differently, then the crisis 
could very plausibly have been averted even after the petitioner protests had begun. First, 
the political developments within East Timor might have transpired very differently in 
2006 if the petitioners’ initial grievances had been dealt with differently. In the immediate 
aftermath of the emergence of the petition, the army sought to establish a commission of 
inquiry into the grievances. However, the commission included members against whom 
complaints had been made, and the move thus undermined potential for an early 
resolution to the conflict. Furthermore, the decision to dismiss the petitioners en masse 
was not supported by the full political elite and escalated the tensions considerably. Had 
the army leadership addressed the grievances of the petitioners and held off on 
dismissing such a large proportion of the F-FDTL, then the initial crisis may have been  
contained and resolved within the security sector, and the state-wide crisis may have been 
avoided. Second, while Prime Minister Alkatiri received much criticism for endorsing the 
dismissals of the petitioners, the televised speech given by President Gusmão in response 
to the dismissals is widely perceived to have inflamed the situation unnecessarily, and 
essentially nationalised a dispute that was until that point primarily limited to the security 
sector. Had the President not made the speech, or had he made a speech taking a more 
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even-handed approach that did not so clearly endorse and reinforce the ‘east versus west’ 
element of the petitioners’ complaints, the rhetoric and ideas of the east/west dispute 
may have been contained within the security services, rather than being mapped on to 
national-level debates, where they helped fuel national-level tensions. Finally, the 
decision of the Prime Minister to call on the F-FDTL to perform civilian law 
enforcement duties and essentially police the petitioners’ protests also exacerbated the 
situation and contributed to rising tensions. Had the maintenance of civil law and order 
been left to the police rather than the army, or had the army exercised more restraint in 
its duties while deployed, further deterioration of the situation, including the breakaway 
rebellion of Alfredo Reinado, may have been avoided.  
Counterfactual analysis has clear limitations, and the exploration of hypothetical 
alternative scenarios that might have taken place cannot identify causal patterns with full 
accuracy. Nonetheless, they can suggest the relative importance of different causal 
factors and highlight the ways in which distinct developments might have contributed to 
an overall outcome. In the case of the 2006 crisis in East Timor, a consideration of 
alternative trajectories suggests that the legacies of UNTAET’s administration played a 
role in the emergence of the petitioner protests. Had UNTAET played a more active role 
in overseeing and managing the recruitment of F-FDTL, then the entire problem may 
never have arisen. However, an important distinction must be made between the 
emergence of the petitioner protests and the deterioration of that initial security-sector 
problem into a wider crisis of the state. Considerations of alternative scenarios suggests 
that it was domestic rather than international factors that, had they transpired differently, 
might have led to the resolution of the initial dispute without the subsequent violence 
and social and political unrest. Certainly, other counterfactual scenarios could be 
examined for East Timor (dealing, for example, with alternative trajectories regarding 
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UN training of the police force rather than the military,87 or in election outcomes that 
might have led to other political leaders other than than those in power at the time), but 
the scenarios examined here represent three of the critical junctures that led from 
security sector tensions to state-level crisis.  
Both an analysis of the causal chain leading to the eventual outcomes, as well as 
consideration of the counterfactual scenarios, thus suggest that analyses that represent 
the 2006 crisis as a failure of the UN are flawed. The UN might have had the 
opportunity to neutralise some of the intra-army divisions through a more forceful 
oversight of the F-FDTL’s initial recruitment, but once the petitioner issue emerged the 
dynamics that directed subsequent events towards a breakdown of state institutions and 
law and order were fundamentally domestically driven. Declaring the UN a failure in 
East Timor due to the events of 2006 thus fails to take into account the real chain of 
causal responsibility that led to the eventual outcome, and over-simplifies what was 
ultimately a complex inter-play of international and primarily domestic dynamics.  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
Efforts to assess the legacies of state-building and to establish whether individual 
international operations were successes or failures face a number of obstacles. Principal 
among them is identifying the causal connections between international actions and the 
domestic political conditions that subsequently emerge. The state-building literature is 
familiar with this challenge and some contributions seek to develop research designs that 
increase the possibility of identifying such causal connections. In some sectors, however, 
                                                
87 The UN role in the establishment of the PNTL has also been criticized, as its initial recruits 
included many former Indonesian police officers, leading to considerable resentment among, and 
tensions with, ex-FALINTIL fighters. See Scambary, ‘Anatomy of a conflict’, p.270. 
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causal claims are made about the impact of international operations that are not well 
supported by causal analysis, and evaluations about success or failure are made that do 
not clearly demonstrate the lines of causal responsibility.  
This article argues that it is only reasonable to evaluate international state-building 
operations on the basis of the domestic conditions that they are causally responsible for 
bringing about. Establishing the necessary chain of causal responsibility is a challenge 
that should be addressed much more directly, and that requires much more explicit 
attention to methodological questions. Three qualitative methodological tools in 
particular – process tracing, counterfactual analysis and the use of control cases – can 
help increase confidence in causal claims and should be used more frequently in the 
state-building literature. By using some or all of these tools in analysis of state-building 
legacies, conclusions regarding the ultimate impact of international interventions can be 
substantially strengthened.  
Although the implications of doing so in the East Timor case is to raise questions 
over claims that the United Nations left damaging legacies in its wake, the aim here is not 
to exonerate the UN, or to present an apology or defence of international state-building. 
Rather, the goal is methodological, and relates simply to the need for greater 
methodological awareness, debate and rigor in the efforts to establish the domestic 
legacies of international interventions. Too often, domestic conditions that follow in the 
wake of international interventions are assumed to follow as a result of international 
interventions. Yet it is often the case that even in the most authoritative of international 
missions, domestic political elites retain significant levels of formal and informal political 
power, and can profoundly shape the direction of national politics. Consequently, it is 
essential that international legacies are disentangled from domestic legacies, and that an 
accurate picture of the international impact is excavated and traced from the complex 
web of national political developments that follow outside intervention. For this to 
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happen, we not only have to think carefully about the standards by which we measure 
international success or failure, but also about the methods we use to ensure that the 
indicators we are measuring are in fact the legacies of the missions we are evaluating, and 
not in fact the result of powerful, autonomous and enduring domestic environments and 
actors.  
 
